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Abstract 
Since the beginning of 1980s, many countries decided to reform and regulate some public utilities such as water, electricity, gas 
etc. Since, the public utilities specially water are managed as regional or local entities, the benchmarking approaches are 
therefore applied to compare the performance of local firms active in an industry on the basis of their relative efficiency along 
with ways that are used to determine the yardstick model for evaluating the performance of such enterprises. Thus, this study 
aims at measuring the efficiency of water & wastewater companies (WWCs) as incentive regulation tools for stimulating 
efficiency of production and supply through cost reduction and improving the quality of services provide by water distributors. In 
this study, the performances of 34 WWCs were assessed using non-parametric methods as “Data Envelopment Analysis” (DEA) 
in 2011. Furthermore, we reviewed the DEA-based Malmquist approach for total factor productivity (TFP) and technology 
change in WWCs over the period of 2008 to 2011. An input variable includes operating costs, number of employees (staff) and 
number of water connections and output variables are the volumes of water billed and the number of customers. The results of 
analysis indicate that the average efficiency of WWCs under constant return to scale (CRS) is equal to 77% 
(technical efficiency) and under variable return to scale (VRS) is equal to 88% (scale efficiency). In other words, 
given the existing resources and facilities, the potential to improve water production equals to 23% and 12% 
respectively. Whereas in terms of constant return to scale (CRS), the cost saving potential amounts to 1874 billion 
Rials or 16% of the operating costs (price=2011). Also, the Malmquist index for total factor productivity (TFP) and 
technology change are calculated as 0.951 and 0.940 respectively, indicating a decrease of productivity in the 
Iranian water & wastewater industry during 2008 to 2011. 
Keywords: Incentive Regulation, Benchmarking, Data envelopment analysis (DEA); Malmquist Index;  
1. Introduction 
In most countries, infrastructural industries or public utilities such as water, electricity, gas, telecommunications 
and transportation, which are mostly run as monopolies, have always been owned and managed by the public sector, 
However the late 1980s, the industry started the privatization trend both in terms of management (private sector 
participation) and in terms of ownership (privatization). In addition to this, the services in some parts of or the entire 
industry have come out of monopoly. However, evidence shows that privatization can’t improve the cost and the 
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quality of services provided. Consistent with the provisions of a proper regulation, it is essential to provide sufficient 
incentives for operators in utilities to reduce costs and to increase efficiency. The regulation systems cover service 
cost, price cap, yardstick competition (YC) and franchise revenues. Some systems such as price cap and yardstick 
competition need benchmarking techniques as tools for regulation. 
The process of benchmarking has long been used by private enterprises, but has only recently been applied in the 
public sector, particularly in the infrastructural services. As mentioned by Shleifer (1985), regulators need a simple 
benchmark, other than the firm’s present or past performance, against which they can evaluate the firm’s potentials 
and assure cost control, prevent waste, and promote cost reducing innovation. The basis of a benchmarking 
technique is the establishment of an efficiency frontier in which each firm occupies a relative position. 
Comparability of outputs and inputs across each firm is a key element, but the most crucial aspect is the selection of 
the measures of efficiency. The key point is that regulators must make choices reflecting overriding objectives of 
water users, firm managers, and policymakers. Selecting a measure of efficiency is also complicated by the fact that, 
although both financial and non-financial measures are used, there is a lack of an accepted framework for integrating 
the two. 
In this article we have applied a particular benchmarking technique known as "Data Envelope Analysis" (DEA) to 
compare the performance of local firms operating in the water and wastewater industry of Iran. The performance 
and technical efficiency rankings extracted from the analysis can be used in the processes or systems of 
regularization including the price cap. 
2. Need for Regulations in public utilities 
According to economic theory, monopoly naturally provides a lower efficiency than the competitiveness, because 
firms holding monopoly have the market power to charge higher prices than the cost of the products and obtain a 
higher rate than normal profits. This leads to economic inefficiencies through higher prices, lower quality products, 
and non-optimal allocation of resources loss of welfare due to inefficiencies in the community. 
Establishment of a regulation system is essential to ensure efficiency and to create incentives for monopoly firms 
in adjusting their pricing and production strategies to a fully competitive approach with the aim of protecting the 
consumers against monopoly power and maximizing the social welfare provided. Water and wastewater services in 
Iran were relegated to water and wastewater companies since 1990. According to legislation, these companies 
should be managed as private entities but the competition in this field is slow. It is necessary that this issue be 
investigated in Iran to actualize the potential for competition in the industry. In this context with proper regulation, 
regulatory reforms and deregulation of the economy, indicators of efficiency and public satisfaction should be 
defined to evaluate the provided services. 
3. Regulation systems 
In general, there are two types of approach to deal with the problem posed by the existence of natural 
monopolies.  First, the regulatory agency approached.  Second, the operation of a public enterprise that is self-
regulated.  The first approach is characterized by the presence of a regulatory agency, which has a duty to design 
regulatory schemes for natural monopoly operation, and the enforcement for compliance of such regulatory regime.  
Under the second general approach, there is a state owned company that operates as a public enterprise, which 
ideally, should allow the provision of services at least cost without the exertion of market power.  In this second 
approach, because of political pressures, and financial constraints, self`-regulated public companies are expected to 
provide water and sanitation services at very low tariff levels, without possibilities of raising enough revenues to 
fund their operational costs. They therefore face serious restrictions to develop investment intended to either 
improve supply coverage or the quality of the provision.  For this reason, and considering the aim of this report, we 
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focused on the first approach to deal with natural monopoly problems; i.e. the existence of a regulatory agency. In 
this approach, there are different specific forms of regulations.  Here we have considered cost-of-service (cost +), 
price-cap, yardstick competition, and franchise.  A hybrid of these alternative systems can also be considered as 
alternative regulatory regimes†: 
• Cost of service (Cost +) 
• Price-Cap 
• Yardstick Competition 
• Franchise regulation 
4. Benchmarking for regulatory purposes 
One of the prime functions of quantitative benchmarking is to assist regulators to define the appropriate policy 
instruments for the water distribution sector, as well as for individual companies. Efficiency analysis and 
benchmarking was first applied to the price reviews of the UK water industry. The Water Service Regulation 
Authority (OFWAT) conducts these price reviews every 5 years (1994, 1999, 2004, and 2009). The approach is used 
by OFWAT in the 1994 review was described by Thanassoulis (2000a, b). OFWAT applied Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) on a company-function level in order to facilitate discrimination in the model (i.e. fewer output 
variables; OFWAT recognized the potential problems resulting from limiting observations, but chose not to use 
panel data). The efficiency results were then compared to regression results, and entered into the price 
determination, with the exact usage being confidential. It is important to note that price caps are not automatically 
determined by OFWAT (stern, 2005), where the calculated efficiency scores are in practice not plugged one–to–one 
into the price cap formulas. The rationale is in general the reliability of data and performance measurement 
techniques as well as controlling the differences in operating characteristics and quality. 
An outline of the use of DEA in the regulation of UK water companies by OFWAT through price cap is shown 
as    , where  is change to the average annual charges company j is permitted to make in year t, 
RPIt is the change in the Retail Prices Index from year t-1 to year t and  is a company – specific factor, 
determined by the regulator for year t. 
5. Efficiency measurement concepts and Benchmarking Approaches 
The primary purpose of this section is to outline a number of commonly used efficiency measures and to discuss 
how they may be calculated relative to an efficient technology, which is generally represented by some form of frontier 
function.  Frontiers have been estimated using many different methods over the past 40 years (represented in figure1).  
The two principal methods are: 
• Data envelopment analysis (DEA) and 
• Stochastic frontiers analysis (SFA), 
 Which involve mathematical programming and econometric methods, respectively. This paper is concerned with 
the use of DEA methods.  The discussion in this section provides a very brief introduction to modern efficiency 
measurement.  A more detailed provided by Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985, 1994) and Lovell (1993).  Modern 
efficiency measurement begins with Farrell (1957) who drew upon the work of Debreu (1951) and Koopmans 
(1951) to define a simple measure of firm efficiency, which could account for multiple inputs. He proposed that the 
efficiency of a firm consists of two components:  technical efficiency, which reflects the ability of a firm to obtain 
maximal output from a given set of inputs, and allocative efficiency, which reflects the ability of a firm to use the inputs 
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total economic efficiency. The following discussion begins with Farrell’s original ideas which were illustrated in 
input/input space and hence had an input-reducing focus.  These are usually termed input-orientated measures. 
Farrell illustrated his ideas using a simple example involving firms which use two inputs (x1 and x2) to produce a 
single output (y), under the assumption of constant returns to …… Knowledge of the unit isoquant of the fully 
efficient firm, represented by in Figure 2, permits the measurement of technical efficiency.  If a given firm uses 
quantities of inputs, defined by the point P, to produce a unit of output, the technical inefficiency of that firm could be 
represented by the distance QP, which is the amount by which all inputs could be proportionally reduced without a 
reduction in output. This is usually expressed in percentage terms by the ratio QP/0P, which represents the percentage 
by which all inputs could be reduced.  The technical efficiency (TE) of a firm is most commonly measured by the ratio: 
TE = OQ / OP0 
Which is equal to one minus QP/0P. It will take a value between zero and one, and hence provides an indicator of the 
degree of technical inefficiency of the firm.  A value of one indicates that the firm is fully technically efficient.  For 
example, the point Q is technically efficient because it lies on the efficient isoquant. 
  
6. Non – Parametric Method: Data Envelop Analysis (DEA) 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) was pioneered by Charnes et al (1978) and based on the work by Farrell (1957).  
DEA is a linear programming technique, which estimates organizational efficiency by measuring the ratio of total 
inputs employed to total output produced for each organization.  This ratio is then compared to others in the sample 
group to derive an estimate of relative efficiency.  DEA identifies the most efficient providers of a good or service 
by their ability to produce a given level of output using the least number of inputs.  Other organizations in the 
sample group receive an efficiency score determined by the variance in their ratio of inputs employed to outputs 
produced relative to the most efficient producer in the sample group.  DEA is therefore a measure of relative 
efficiency against the sample group’s benchmark best practice.  The advantage is that it can be used without input or 
output prices, which is useful in the case of the water industry where these are often distorted by a lack of 
competitive forces or political decisions.  Instead, simply volumes of output (including quality indicators) and inputs 
can be used.  DEA analysis undertaken to date has tended to rely on a small number of variables (e.g. volume of 
water delivered, the number of properties connection; operating expenditure, capital) (see Lambert, Dichev and 
Raffiee 1993. Sawkins and Accam 1994; Thanassouloulis 2000, 2002; Coelli and Walding 1994. Garcia-Sanchez 
2006), although there are also a number of instances where a greater number of variables have been utilized (see 
Anwandter and Ozuna 2002; Byrnes, Grosskopf and Hayes 1986; Woodbury and Dollery 2004).   
Charnes proposed a flexible approach, Cooper & Rhodes CCR (1978) and it is relative eciency measurement. 
The model can be briefly described as follows.  
There are m inputs (indexed by the subscript i), s outputs (indexed by subscript r) and n decision making units-
DMUs indexed by subscript j); additionally one assumes that    and    denote positive inputs and 
outputs respectively. CCR consider the following optimization problem:  
    The problem needs to be solved for each DMU and represents the objective of maximizing a virtual output 
relative to a virtual input subject to the constraint that no DMU can operate beyond the eciency frontier (constraint 
2) and the constraint relating to non-negative weights (constraint 3). In this paper, we will focus on the behavior of 
technical eciency as obtained from a DEA model that allows variable returns to scale. Inputs and outputs weights 
are endogenously determined as the solution to the problem for each DMU. In fact, Banker, Charnes & Cooper-BCC 
(1984) and Banker (1984) extended the CCR model from the constant returns to scale to the variable returns to scale 
case. That extension accounts to including an extra convexity restriction in the CCR model. An important result that 
emerges from those papers refers to the possibility of factoring total eciency (as obtained from de CCR model) as 
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the product of technical eciency (as obtained from the BCC model) and scale eciency. Therefore, the BCC 
model is more relevant for analyzing sectors where variable returns to scale is an important feature.  
The previously mentioned model admits a linear programming representation that has to be solved for each DMU. 
The resulting scores are relative eciency measures where a score of 1 indicates an ecient unit whereas scores 
that are less than 1 indicate inecient units. Inecient units are identified by comparison with reference units 
(peers). Therefore, it is desirable that the involved units must be comparable. It is also important to emphasize that 
the model imposes few restrictions on the production set and an associated convenience is that one does not need to 
assume a direct transformation of the postulated inputs into the chosen outputs. 
7. Malmquist Productivity Index 
So far, the focus has been on evaluating firm performance at appointed in time. To evaluate the efficiency change 
overtime, the Malmquist productivity index is issued in the following analysis: 
Suppose each     produces a vector of outputs       by using a vector of inputs 
     at each time period t, t=1, 2, T. When multiple inputs are used to produce multiple outputs, 
Shephard’s (1953) distance functions provide a functional characterization of the Structure of production 
technology. The output distance function is defined on the output set, P (x), as: 
                         (1) 
The Malmquist productivity index is defined as: 
  
   
     
              (2) 
 Measures the productivity change of  between period t and t+1. A value greater than one indicates 
positive productivity growth from period t to period t+1. A value less than one indicate negative productivity growth 
from period t to period t+1(Färeetal.1994a).   
The Malmquist productivity index can be decomposed in to two components: efficiency change (catch-up effect) 




                              (3) 
Technology Change: TC= 
   
     
       (4) 
                                                                       (5) 
According to Fare et al. (1994b), EC can be further decomposed into scale efficiency change and pure technology 
change. Ray and Desli (1997) pointed out the internal potential inconsistency problem of the further decomposition 
— both CRS and VRS models are used in the same decomposition. Consequently, the current paper uses the 
accepted decomposition shown in (6). 
8. Inputs and Outputs Variables 
Table 2 presents the name of input and output variables. And Table 3 presents means and standard deviations for 
input and output variables of the 35 water & wastewater companies. 
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9. Results 
Technical and scale efficiency scores for water & wastewater companies can be found in table 4. Also the 
potential cost saving and productivity changes based on Malmquist Index can be found in tables 4 and 5 
respectively. 
10. Conclusion 
The results of analysis indicate that average efficiency of WWCs under constant return to scale (CRS) is equal to 
77% (technical efficiency) and under variable return to scale (VRS) to 88% (scale efficiency). In other words, there 
is a possibility for improvement of water production equal to 23% and 12% respectively with the existing resources 
and possibilities. Also, in terms of constant return to scale (CRS), by improving technical efficiency, cost savings 
potential account to 1874 billion Rials, which is over 16% of the total operating cost of 35 major water & 
wastewater companies in 2010/2011. Also, the Malmquist index for total factor productivity (TFP) and technology 
change were calculated as 0.951 and 0.940 respectively, indicating a decrease of productivity in Iran’s water & 
wastewater industry during 2008 to 2011. 
The results prove that DEA analysis is a powerful tool for water industry regulators who seek to defend the public 
interest against the potential abuse of monopoly power and to encourage water providers to improve efficiency. 
11. Tables 
 
Table 1: DEA Model Specification 
 
Variables Model 1 CCR; Model 2 BCC 
Inputs 
Operating costs 
Number of Employees 
Number of water connections 
Outputs Volume of water billed Number of customers 
 
 
Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations for Efficient and Inefficient water & wastewater companies 
Sample Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Outputs:     
Water Billed () 117,746,791 196,727,822 22,464,299 1,201,337,762 
Number of customers 528,413 733,183 104,977 4,397,155 
Inputs:     
Operating costs (Million Rials) 342,748 651,902 60,210 4,002,776 
Number of Employees 616 817 133 4,937 
Number of water connections 410,051 474,822 104,196 2,874,757 
 
 
Table 3: Technical & Scale Efficiency Scores 
Firm Efficiency Scale type Firm 
Efficiency Scale 
type CRS VRS SC CRS VRS SC 
1 0.917 1 0.917 drs 19 0.674 0.706 0.955 drs 
2 1 1 1 - 20 0.856 0.858 0.998 irs 
3 0.699 0.745 0.938 irs 21 0.504 1 0.504 irs 
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4 1 1 1 - 22 0.954 0.958 0.995 irs 
5 0.482 0.99 0.487 irs 23 0.723 0.76 0.952 irs 
6 0.667 0.912 0.731 irs 24 0.892 0.897 0.994 drs 
7 0.971 1 0.971 drs 25 0.886 0.933 0.949 irs 
8 0.568 0.844 0.673 irs 26 0.78 1 0.78 irs 
9 0.693 0.697 0.994 drs 27 0.797 0.957 0.833 irs 
10 0.778 0.817 0.952 drs 28 0.834 0.842 0.99 irs 
11 0.612 0.857 0.715 irs 29 0.56 0.618 0.906 irs 
12 0.632 0.783 0.807 irs 30 0.635 1 0.635 irs 
13 0.593 0.733 0.809 irs 31 0.74 0.759 0.976 drs 
14 0.488 0.495 0.986 irs 32 0.608 0.747 0.814 irs 
15 1 1 1 - 33 0.934 0.952 0.981 irs 
16 0.947 0.959 0.987 irs 34 0.902 0.905 0.997 irs 
17 0.815 1 0.815 irs 35 1 1 1 - 
18 0.915 0.922 0.993 irs Mean 0.773 0.876 0.887 ------- 
Note: Observations, which score less than 1, are inefficient. 
CRS = Constant returns to scale, VRS = variable returns to scale, SC = scale efficiency 
irs= increasing returns to scale, drs= decreasing returns to scale, - = constant returns to scale 
 
 
Table 4: Potential Cost Saving 
DMUs Score Inefficiency Operation Potential Cost Score Scale 
DMU_01 0.917 0.083 370115               30,720  1 0.917 
DMU_02 1.000 0 211957                        -    1 1.000 
DMU_03 0.699 0.301 138159               41,586  0.745 0.938 
DMU_04 1.000 0 557377                        -    1 1.000 
DMU_05 0.482 0.518 113517               58,802  0.99 0.487 
DMU_06 0.667 0.333 169156               56,329  0.912 0.731 
DMU_07 0.971 0.029 4002776            116,081  1 0.971 
DMU_08 0.568 0.432 123686               53,432  0.844 0.673 
DMU_09 0.693 0.307 276341               84,837  0.697 0.994 
DMU_10 0.778 0.222 636030            141,199  0.817 0.952 
DMU_11 0.612 0.388 168700               65,455  0.857 0.715 
DMU_12 0.632 0.368 133659               49,186  0.783 0.807 
DMU_13 0.593 0.407 385646            156,958  0.733 0.809 
DMU_14 0.488 0.512 484550            248,089  0.495 0.986 
DMU_15 1.000 0 88862                        -    1 1.000 
DMU_16 0.947 0.053 131192                 6,953  0.959 0.987 
DMU_17 0.815 0.185 78763               14,571  1 0.815 
DMU_18 0.915 0.085 96217                 8,178  0.922 0.993 
DMU_19 0.674 0.326 289599               94,409  0.706 0.955 
DMU_20 0.856 0.144 180326               25,967  0.858 0.998 
DMU_21 0.504 0.496 96885               48,055  1 0.504 
DMU_22 0.954 0.046 184771                 8,499  0.958 0.995 
DMU_23 0.723 0.277 176659               48,935  0.76 0.952 
DMU_24 0.892 0.108 357514               38,611  0.897 0.994 
DMU_25 0.886 0.114 241738               27,558  0.933 0.949 
DMU_26 0.78 0.22 60210               13,246  1 0.780 
DMU_27 0.797 0.203 310500               63,032  0.957 0.833 
DMU_28 0.834 0.166 151406               25,133  0.842 0.990 
DMU_29 0.56 0.44 279839            123,129  0.618 0.906 
DMU_30 0.635 0.365 73492               26,824  1 0.635 
DMU_31 0.74 0.26 221823               57,674  0.759 0.976 
DMU_32 0.608 0.392 223533               87,625  0.747 0.814 
DMU_33 0.934 0.066 229437               15,143  0.952 0.981 
DMU_34 0.902 0.098 390614               38,280  0.905 0.997 
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DMUs Score Inefficiency Operation Potential Cost Score Scale 
DMU_35 1.000 0 361140                        -    1 1.000 
  0.7730286            1,874,498  0.8756 0.887 
 
 
Table 5: Productivity changes based on Malmquist Index 
Firm EFCH TCH PECH SECH TFPCH Firm EFCH TCH PECH SECH TFPCH 
1 1.032 1.012 1.071 0.963 1.044 18 0.959 0.946 0.967 0.992 0.907 
2 1 1.049 1 1 1.049 19 1.011 0.916 1.001 1.01 0.926 
3 0.945 0.949 0.966 0.979 0.897 20 1.008 0.955 1.012 0.996 0.962 
4 1 1.007 1 1 1.007 21 1.083 0.87 1 1.083 0.942 
5 1.034 0.835 1.007 1.027 0.863 22 1.072 1.011 1.053 1.018 1.084 
6 1.027 0.915 0.996 1.032 0.94 23 0.882 0.899 0.884 0.998 0.793 
7 1 0.865 1 1 0.865 24 1 0.921 1 1 0.921 
8 0.978 0.948 0.958 1.02 0.926 25 1.038 0.99 1.027 1.011 1.028 
9 1.029 0.953 1.033 0.996 0.98 26 0.998 0.999 1 0.998 0.997 
10 1.103 0.801 1.091 1.011 0.883 27 1.02 0.954 1.042 0.979 0.973 
11 1.025 0.922 1.011 1.014 0.944 28 0.998 0.954 1.008 0.99 0.952 
12 0.931 0.937 0.934 0.997 0.873 29 1.082 0.931 1.103 0.982 1.008 
13 1.06 0.872 1.112 0.953 0.925 30 0.973 0.982 1 0.973 0.955 
14 0.993 0.872 0.976 1.018 0.866 31 0.992 0.99 0.993 0.999 0.982 
15 1 0.946 1 1 0.946 32 1.025 0.943 1.014 1.01 0.966 
16 1.034 0.954 1.014 1.02 0.986 33 1.07 0.925 1.026 1.043 0.99 
17 1.05 0.964 1 1.05 1.012 34 0.973 1.029 0.965 1.008 1.001 
 mean 1.012 0.94 1.007 1.005 0.951 
EFCH = efficiency change, TCH = technical change, PECH = pure efficiency change, SECH = scale efficiency change, TFPCH = total factor 
productivity change 
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